Complicity, Passivity and the Extension of Tacit Support
I have often said, to no shortage of criticism, that passive acceptance of an unjust institution is tantamount to the commission of an active injustice. I usually justify this by pointing out the the passive participant both accepts the benefits of an injustice that flow toward him/her and does not do anything to actively disrupt the continuance of this injustice. Well, I have just completed an essay by Hannah Arendt entitled "Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship" where she addresses this phenomenon more eloquently (I will be quoting directly from Arendt without citation, and paraphrasing even more extensively, it should be clear that the ideas are to be attributed to Arendt from the aforementioned essay and then applied by myself in the final analysis).
Arendt is speaking in this instance about those who tacitly supported the Nazi regime by not retreating from public life (it is important to mention that one premise of this is that under a Totalitarian regime the dictatorship makes an ideological monolith out of public life, whereby even the most insignificant public functionary is a prop under the regimes power). In particular, she is addressing those who claimed they were merely obeying the laws of the land, and that "obedience" is a political virtue without which no body politic could survive. This she claims is a common fallacy in political theory that runs all the way back to classical philosophy.
The fallacy appears plausible because of its close relationship to the theoretic truth that all governments rely on the consent of the governed ("consent" can also be forced or coerced, it just needs to be present) and then the fallible identification of consent with obedience. She suggests that this is a lingering effect of the classical conception of government as a relationship between the rulers and the ruled whereby the former give orders and the latter obey. This conception, Arendt claims, supplanted an earlier and more adequate conception of participation in concerted action.
This earlier conception saw concerted action as a two stage process. In the first stage "leadership" initiates the action, and in the second stage many join to support a "common enterprise." The idea behind this theory of concerted action is that nobody can accomplish anything in the realm of public and concerted action without the help of many others. The leader, in essence, is just the first among equals in the concerted action needed to achieve the common enterprise.
From here Arendt suggests that the "nonparticipators in public life under totalitarian dictatorship," by shunning responsibility in those places where their support was needed "under the name of obedience," were the only ones who were not responsible for supporting the regime. Therein lies the power of nonviolent resistance or civil disobedience. Where enough people act irresponsibly when leadership demands their "obedience," it is clear what a disruptive effect this would have on the commission of political injustice. In the end Arendt suggests that one should not ask functionary participants, "Why did you obey?," but, "Why did you support?" There is no such thing as obedience among equals, only support, and concerted action requires the support of many.
It is clear that our society is not totalitarian and that mere participation in the public realm is not the commission or support of monolithic injustice. However, there are places of responsibility where injustice requires "obedience." This is most clearly illustrated in the way that the nonviolent resistance to apartheid in America in the 60's made it impossible to (explicitly) maintain such a system. By removing support for explicit racial inequity the "leaders" no longer had the support necessary to achieve concerted public action.
Non-explicit racial and gender injustices are more complicated issues because it is much more difficult to locate where one's support is aiding in the commission of a concerted action whose end is social injustice. To further complicate the matter in many cases these "spaces of responsibility" have been "privatized." Nevertheless, it is still true that where such "spaces of responsibility" are found, a failure to remove one's support is tantamount to direct complicity in the action since these actions rely on widespread support. So when one locates a law that reinforces an unjust social order (and I am not demanding the imposition of a certain moral perspective, there are certain occasions where we can achieve an intersubjective consensus, a sensus communis, that a given end is unjust) if one does not then withdraw their support, act "irresponsibly," defy the laws, then one is supporting an injustice.
Some of these "places" have been located and nothing has been done to end the injustices they perpetuate, and its not enough to ignore or refuse to learn of these "places," because its widely accepted that ignorance is not an excuse for the commission of a wrong, especially when it is an intentional ignorance.
Arendt is speaking in this instance about those who tacitly supported the Nazi regime by not retreating from public life (it is important to mention that one premise of this is that under a Totalitarian regime the dictatorship makes an ideological monolith out of public life, whereby even the most insignificant public functionary is a prop under the regimes power). In particular, she is addressing those who claimed they were merely obeying the laws of the land, and that "obedience" is a political virtue without which no body politic could survive. This she claims is a common fallacy in political theory that runs all the way back to classical philosophy.
The fallacy appears plausible because of its close relationship to the theoretic truth that all governments rely on the consent of the governed ("consent" can also be forced or coerced, it just needs to be present) and then the fallible identification of consent with obedience. She suggests that this is a lingering effect of the classical conception of government as a relationship between the rulers and the ruled whereby the former give orders and the latter obey. This conception, Arendt claims, supplanted an earlier and more adequate conception of participation in concerted action.
This earlier conception saw concerted action as a two stage process. In the first stage "leadership" initiates the action, and in the second stage many join to support a "common enterprise." The idea behind this theory of concerted action is that nobody can accomplish anything in the realm of public and concerted action without the help of many others. The leader, in essence, is just the first among equals in the concerted action needed to achieve the common enterprise.
From here Arendt suggests that the "nonparticipators in public life under totalitarian dictatorship," by shunning responsibility in those places where their support was needed "under the name of obedience," were the only ones who were not responsible for supporting the regime. Therein lies the power of nonviolent resistance or civil disobedience. Where enough people act irresponsibly when leadership demands their "obedience," it is clear what a disruptive effect this would have on the commission of political injustice. In the end Arendt suggests that one should not ask functionary participants, "Why did you obey?," but, "Why did you support?" There is no such thing as obedience among equals, only support, and concerted action requires the support of many.
It is clear that our society is not totalitarian and that mere participation in the public realm is not the commission or support of monolithic injustice. However, there are places of responsibility where injustice requires "obedience." This is most clearly illustrated in the way that the nonviolent resistance to apartheid in America in the 60's made it impossible to (explicitly) maintain such a system. By removing support for explicit racial inequity the "leaders" no longer had the support necessary to achieve concerted public action.
Non-explicit racial and gender injustices are more complicated issues because it is much more difficult to locate where one's support is aiding in the commission of a concerted action whose end is social injustice. To further complicate the matter in many cases these "spaces of responsibility" have been "privatized." Nevertheless, it is still true that where such "spaces of responsibility" are found, a failure to remove one's support is tantamount to direct complicity in the action since these actions rely on widespread support. So when one locates a law that reinforces an unjust social order (and I am not demanding the imposition of a certain moral perspective, there are certain occasions where we can achieve an intersubjective consensus, a sensus communis, that a given end is unjust) if one does not then withdraw their support, act "irresponsibly," defy the laws, then one is supporting an injustice.
Some of these "places" have been located and nothing has been done to end the injustices they perpetuate, and its not enough to ignore or refuse to learn of these "places," because its widely accepted that ignorance is not an excuse for the commission of a wrong, especially when it is an intentional ignorance.
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