Monday, July 19, 2004

Barthes response

I would suggest a rather unsatisfying verdict on the "must."  Perhaps it is a pure turn of rhetoric to suggest disdain for the "progressive humanism" he is discussing.  I would have to see more of the context.  I am having trouble with the idea of the post though.  As I take it Barthes is criticizing at once both essentialist and historicist coneptions of the "nature" of man.  The former being that, stripped of all the contingencies layered on by history and the social, one may uncover the "essence" or "nature" of man.  The latter suggesting that man is the result of a historical process of construction and conditioning.  Correct me if I am wrong please. 
 
When I see the word "mystifying" it suggests to me a kind of fetishism or reification.  So the "essential" searcher is looking for reified or abstract man, this is one of the ideas of "human nature" that I adamantly oppose.  In no place is a search for "nature" less suited than in the fetishized world of the universal.  I can see where post-structuralist Barthes would have a hard time digesting the idea of the essential, objective, and universal idea of the "natural" man (to what extent is such an idea merely a falsifiable "center" of a structure).
 
On the other hand, historicism is also constantly assaulted by the post-structuralist/postmodernist aversion to the grand enlightenment narratives.  I tend to find myself leaning toward the idea that "man" is a particular process, and whether you decide to allow your abstraction to be the static essence of man, or the universal grand historical scheme of man, you are still searching for the "natural" in the most unnatural of places. 
 
My conception of the human process is one that leans heavily on the aesthetic, and in particular Kant's aesthetic.  The "human process" is "purposiveness," or a kind of meandering tale of creation, interpretation, and recreation.  This process is directed at objects and includes the "self," which we have learned to craft quite effectively with that most human tool, complex language. 
 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the search for a "human nature."  We have here a general concept that may exist entirely to add continuity and fluidity to language.  Where in the world does one ever see an abstract generality other than in one's mind to connect the experience of particulars (and here it is a particular mental image!).  "This particular thing is a subset of 'man' and ought to behave and be encountered according to the rules embodied in that concept."  The dilution of particulars and mutual construction (between subject and object) can help to alleviate the shock of encountering a particular.  The idea of "human nature" is a tool of experience that helps us to encounter ourselves and those around us, hence it cannot be either natural or essential to man.  It is as inherent to man as the hammer he uses to build his home, the brush he uses to paint his Mona Lisa, or the piano he uses to play his sonata.
 
I have gotten well ahead of myself and far beyond the bounds of having thought this out so I will end here.  This is a rough and fragile sketch of my "human nature" post that should be forthcoming so I suggest holding criticism till then except as pertains to how I read the post on Barthes  (I would like to stay on Barthes for a bit and fear sidetracking the subject).  I have one aesthetic essay by Barthes on the plates of encyclopedias which may not be much aid in understanding your post but I am currently working through it. 

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