Barthes Reloaded
I'll wait for your final post on this topic for comments, but I can't hold this one back. When you affirm that every man is a "particular thing" are you then also affirming a sort of trancendental individualism? I use "transcendental" in this case to mean something that is above and beyond any physical presence, like indentical twins are two different particular things rather than two instances of the same thing. Is it even possible for there to be two instances of the same thing if you follow your line of reasoning? Or even two related things? If not, where does that leave us?
To make myself clear: if I observe two distinct objects that act the same and appear materially identical, then on what basis can I affirm that they are two different things other than the metaphysical? (Or I could say "they are not REALLY identical" but if I can't tell then it amounts to the same thing). What's the real illusion in this situation? This is an honest question because I feel genuinely confused about this! Would it be wrong to generalize about the natural "thingness" of things, or since there are only "particular things" (what does that phrase mean at this point?) can I attribute nothing at all generally to them--not even the quality of being a thing?
In other words, aren't you attributing a quality called "particularity" to a class of objects called "things"? Is "things", like "men" a figment of language? I mean, is there any legitimate use for the number 2? (2? 2 what?) Help you've broken philosophy!
I get the sense that if someone was speaking of the nature of fish to swim in water or, say, of lava rocks to be dense I doubt it would provoke the kind of nominalism you seem to be leaning towards. In the case of writers like Barthes I feel like it is a form of humanism (as he admits to) that is ideologically based that is the culprit; there is nothing ideologically at stake when I classify a group of objects as "hammers". And, for the post-structuralists, all that's LEFT is language (signifiers floating free of the signified), which is to say that all that's left is ideology--there's no other choice! And I feel quite a bit of despair at this condition. But why, what's the point of such despair over quite literally nothing? I can't put it any other way.
At least modernism allows me the dignity of my despair. Postmodernism insults me with notions of "play"! I'd rather have the illusion of dignity.
Ignore this if it's a part of your larger post to follow! I have other questions but I'll hold them.
Oh wait another: are all generalities necessarily abstract and metaphysical? Is this where common sense and philosophy part ways? Where does probability fit in here? (Is the great "50-50" theory rearing its head?!!?) I'd also say to be careful to consider the full range of meanings that the term "human nature" has.
I hope I've made some sense, and that you can help me out.
To make myself clear: if I observe two distinct objects that act the same and appear materially identical, then on what basis can I affirm that they are two different things other than the metaphysical? (Or I could say "they are not REALLY identical" but if I can't tell then it amounts to the same thing). What's the real illusion in this situation? This is an honest question because I feel genuinely confused about this! Would it be wrong to generalize about the natural "thingness" of things, or since there are only "particular things" (what does that phrase mean at this point?) can I attribute nothing at all generally to them--not even the quality of being a thing?
In other words, aren't you attributing a quality called "particularity" to a class of objects called "things"? Is "things", like "men" a figment of language? I mean, is there any legitimate use for the number 2? (2? 2 what?) Help you've broken philosophy!
I get the sense that if someone was speaking of the nature of fish to swim in water or, say, of lava rocks to be dense I doubt it would provoke the kind of nominalism you seem to be leaning towards. In the case of writers like Barthes I feel like it is a form of humanism (as he admits to) that is ideologically based that is the culprit; there is nothing ideologically at stake when I classify a group of objects as "hammers". And, for the post-structuralists, all that's LEFT is language (signifiers floating free of the signified), which is to say that all that's left is ideology--there's no other choice! And I feel quite a bit of despair at this condition. But why, what's the point of such despair over quite literally nothing? I can't put it any other way.
At least modernism allows me the dignity of my despair. Postmodernism insults me with notions of "play"! I'd rather have the illusion of dignity.
Ignore this if it's a part of your larger post to follow! I have other questions but I'll hold them.
Oh wait another: are all generalities necessarily abstract and metaphysical? Is this where common sense and philosophy part ways? Where does probability fit in here? (Is the great "50-50" theory rearing its head?!!?) I'd also say to be careful to consider the full range of meanings that the term "human nature" has.
I hope I've made some sense, and that you can help me out.
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